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Abstract 
 
Strengthening the rule of law and promoting access to justice in developing countries have been 
longstanding international policy objectives. However, the standard policy tools, such as 
technical assistance and material aid, are routinely criticized for failing to achieve their 
objectives. The rare exception is paralegal aid, which is almost universally lauded by 
policymakers and scholars as effective in promoting the rule of law and access to justice. This 
belief, however, rests on a very limited empirical foundation regarding what paralegal programs 
accomplish and under what theory they operate. This paper critically examines the conventional 
wisdom surrounding paralegal initiatives through case studies of two successful paralegal 
programs in post-conflict Timor-Leste that are broadly representative of the type of initiatives 
commonly implemented in developing countries. These programs did improve access to justice 
services, bolster choice between dispute resolution forums, and increase local knowledge of 
progressive norms on human rights and women’s rights. Yet, as this article shows, even 
successful programs can expect to achieve only incremental gains in promoting the rule of law 
because advances largely depend on alignment with the priorities of powerful state and non-state 
actors, donors, program implementers, and paralegals themselves. To date, the literature has not 
acknowledged these limitations. This article addresses this gap by demonstrating that paralegal 
aid faces multiple challenges that mean paralegals cannot necessarily transcend or modify deep 
seated norms and power structures. These issues include principal agent-problems due to the 
extensive delegation required, internal limitations resulting from paralegals’ limited authority 
and independence, and external constraints from state and non-state justice actors. Paralegal 
programs also face program design, implementation, and sustainability challenges. 
Consequently, scholars, practitioners, and policymakers need to adopt a more balanced view of 
paralegal aid. 
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I. Introduction  
 
The rule of law produces immense benefits. It has been widely linked to the creation and 
maintenance of democratic government (Diamond 1999, Fukuyama 2014) and can foster both 
economic and human development (North, Wallis and Weingast 2009, Acemoglu and Robinson 
2012). Promoting the rule of law and more equitable state legal systems that facilitate access to 
justice has emerged as a significant, internationally recognized priority. Yet the results of these 
efforts have been limited (Kleinfeld 2012).
1
 
At the same time, scholars and policymakers have increasingly recognized the role of non-state 
justice in establishing and maintaining local order. Non-state justice systems, rooted in custom, 
religion, ethnicity, tribalism or some other shared bond, resolve most disputes in developing 
countries (Kyed 2011: 5). Non-state justice actors can play particularly vital roles in conflict-
prone states where state institutions have limited capacity or legitimacy (Menkhaus 2007). 
International policymakers and practitioners seeking to improve the justice sector have 
increasingly determined that engaging with justice providers beyond the state is essential. The 
dual emphasis, however, on promoting a state bound by the rule of law and access to justice 
while simultaneously engaging powerful and respected non-state actors is challenging because 
these institutions almost invariably operate according to different normative foundations (Migdal 
1988: 31). In some instances, they can even be diametrically opposed (Swenson 2017). 
 
One area of international support, however, where optimism remains the norm is paralegal aid. 
Paralegals are “lay people with basic training in law and formal government who assist poor and 
otherwise disempowered communities” (Maru 2006: 429).  Paralegal programs are seen as 
making a significant contribution to the rule of law independent of the state’s capacity, reach, 
and legitimacy and the non-state justice sector’s structure and principles.  Stephen Golub, for 
instance, contends that “paralegal development merits special mention because it transcends 
many societies and sectors” (Golub 2003: 31). Paralegal assistance seems to offer that ever-
elusive commodity: a do-no-harm intervention with the capacity to improve both the state and 
non-state justice sectors in almost any setting, including post-conflict societies (Stromseth, 
Wippman and Brooks 2007: 340-341). 
 
Yet there is a surprisingly weak empirical foundation for these beliefs that paralegal programs 
can consistently transcend the challenges of promoting the rule of law and access to justice 
(Carothers 2003). This article serves, in part, as a corrective to this prevalent narrative. It argues 
that paralegal aid can have a positive impact, but programming faces far more obstacles and 
limitations than is generally acknowledged. While paralegal initiatives can help promote the rule 
of law and access to justice under certain conditions, this article demonstrates that paralegal 
initiatives face intrinsic obstacles that cannot be eliminated through better program design, 
management practice, or participant selection. It seeks to add empirical rigor to the analysis of 
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paralegal assistance and explore its theoretical implications. The research also has significant 
policy implications because “programmes with paralegals, facilitators or barefoot lawyers are 
now among the most popular methods to increase access to justice in developing countries” 
(Barendrecht, Gramatikov et al., 2012: 7). This trend shows little sign of abating as “future 
justice programming is expected to place greater emphasis on primary justice and non-state 
actors, including paralegals” (UNDP, UN Women et al. 2012: 257). 
 
Paper Overview 
 
Paralegal programs constitute a vital yet understudied and undertheorized area of inquiry.  This 
article examines the theory and practice underpinning paralegal aid and its implications for 
policy through six sections. The first section outlines predominant beliefs about paralegal 
assistance among scholars, practitioners, and donors through a review of existing academic and 
non-peer reviewed grey literature produced by governments, international organizations, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and other relevant actors. The second explains and justifies 
the case selection. The third section provides a historical background of law and justice in 
Timor-Leste, while the fourth describes Timor-Leste’s two largest donor-funded community 
paralegal initiatives. The fifth section details these programs’ accomplishments.  The sixth 
section looks at the intrinsic challenges these initiatives encountered, including principal-agent 
problems due to the extensive delegation required as well as internal constraints that arose from 
paralegals’ lack of inherent authority. It highlights significant external constraints as paralegals 
were subject to the influence of both state and non-state authorities. These programs also face 
design, implementation, and sustainability challenges that influence their ability to achieve their 
objectives. The conclusion assesses the overall impact of paralegal approaches in Timor-Leste 
along with their theory testing and theory building implications, and identifies areas for further 
research. 
 
II. Positive Views of Paralegal Assistance in Academic and Grey Literature 
 
Scholars’, donors’, and NGOs’ generally positive assessment of international paralegal support 
stands in stark contrast to the sustained criticism development assistance has faced in general 
(Easterly 2006) and with regards to the legal sector (Tamanaha 2011a).
2
 This favorable view 
extends to support in highly legally-pluralist settings including conflict-prone states (Stromseth, 
Wippman, and Brooks 2006: 339-340, Maru 2010).  
 
Academic Literature 
 
International paralegal assistance has not received the scholarly attention it deserves, especially 
given its prominence in international assistance. The existing academic literature is 
predominantly positive, even in challenging situations. Stephen Golub, the leading proponent of 
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a legal empowerment approach that prioritizes “strengthening the roles, capacities and power of 
the disadvantaged and civil society,” strongly endorses paralegal assistance (Golub 2007: 53). He 
maintains that paralegals can undertake a range of activities “from providing basic information 
and advice on the one hand to representation in administrative processes and assisting litigation 
on the other” (Golub 2003: 33).  Vivek Maru, a scholar-practitioner who is the co-founder of 
Timap for Justice, a paralegal organization in post-conflict Sierra Leone that has garnered much 
attention and received extensive donor support including from the Open Society Foundation and 
World Bank, has drawn upon his experience to write extensively about the benefits of paralegal 
programs (Maru 2006, Maru 2010). He argues that paralegals promote access to justice and legal 
literacy in a cost-effective and sustainable manner. Maru highlights that paralegals “provide  
information  on  rights  and  procedures,  mediate  conflicts,  and  assist  clients  in  dealing  with  
government  and  chiefdom  authorities” as well as oversee  “community  education  and 
dialogue, advocate  for change with both traditional and formal  authorities,  and  organize  
community  members  to  undertake  collective  action” (Maru 2006: 442). Braithwaite posits 
paralegals can make significant contributions to justice in developing countries like Bangladesh, 
while also potentially fighting corruption and being “an effective approach to preventing one 
important root cause of terrorism in the region of greatest rural poverty in Bangladesh” 
(Braithwaite 2015: 321). 
 
As for post-conflict contexts, Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks contend paralegals “may be able 
to develop useful synergies (and even healthy competition) between the formal and informal 
dispute resolution mechanisms” after conflict as well as increase popular awareness of legal 
rights and improve the quality of both state and non-state justice in a cost-effective manner 
(2007: 340-341). The positive role of paralegals in promoting access to justice, knowledge about 
the legal system, and dispute resolution has been echoed by the RAND Corporation’s highly 
influential survey on post-conflict nation building (Dobbins, Jones et al. 2007: 90). Baker has 
highlighted the important role paralegals play in linking state and non-state justice in post-
conflict and low capacity states (Baker 2010: 610).  
 
Paralegal aid proponents recognize that programming issues can arise. Golub, for instance, 
acknowledges that paralegals’ “effectiveness often hinges on their levels of education, the 
degrees to which their communities are organized, the extent to which government is responsive, 
and the overall political milieu within which they operate” while stressing that “even modest 
initial achievements can set the stage for more dramatic impact down the line” (Golub 2003: 35). 
In general, paralegal programs’ challenges are portrayed as technocratic or implementation 
issues, such as exercising careful judgment in selecting participants, ensuring paralegals have or 
can gain access to sufficient training, providing for program sustainability, and maintaining a 
constructive relationship with the local community, state, and donors (van Rooij 2012). While 
these considerations are important, this article will argue they are insufficient. Paralegal 
programs face inherent obstacles that cannot be addressed simply by arguing for better program 
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design, management practice, or the careful selection of paralegals.  
 
Grey Literature from Practitioners and Policymakers 
 
Enthusiasm for paralegal programs extends beyond academia up to the highest levels of the 
international system and down to in-country NGO operations. The Commission on Legal 
Empowerment, a United Nations (UN)-backed task force featuring a range of esteemed scholars 
and policymakers, captures the prevailing ethos. The Commission unequivocally praised 
paralegals as “critically important to improving legal service delivery to poor communities” 
(Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and UNDP 2008: 24). The Commission 
contends that in addition to offering legal education and legal representation, paralegals can 
“mediat[e] conflicts, organis[e] collective action, and advocate[e] with both traditional and 
formal authorities” and as a result paralegals are robust sources of legal related services (Id.: 23). 
In the Commission’s view, not only do paralegals offer “cost advantages” relative to lawyers, 
“but paralegals may be better positioned to engage in a broader, empowerment-oriented method 
of legal service delivery” (Id.: 25).3 The Commission is not alone. A joint United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and UN Women 
report on engaging informal justice systems has endorsed paralegal programming (UNDP, UN 
Women et al. 2012: 27-28). Key international organizations, major bilateral donors, and leading 
international NGOs have likewise embraced paralegal programming (GTZ 2004, Asian 
Development Bank and Asia Foundation 2009: 43, Open Society Foundations 2010, 
International Law Development Organization 2016).  
 
III. Paralegal Program Case Studies Selection and Justification 
 
This article examines the two most important, internationally funded paralegal programs in 
Timor-Leste: the Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF) Grassroots Justice Project and the Asia 
Foundation’s Access to Justice Program. The analysis offers a mixture of “theory building” by 
seeking to illuminate some conditions in which paralegal programs may be successful and 
“theory testing” the dominant view that paralegal programs have significant potential to promote 
the rule of law in almost all circumstances (George and Bennett 2005: 114-120).   
 
Paralegal programs in Timor-Leste represent strong test cases because the country setting, the 
program type, and the challenges and opportunities these donor-backed paralegal programs faced 
are commonplace across settings. While stressing there is no universal template, Maru identifies 
four main traits that constitute “the essence of the paralegal approach” (Maru 2006: 469). First, 
paralegals should be “lay people working directly with the poor or otherwise disadvantaged” 
who have received training on both substantive legal matters and relevant skills such as 
mediation, advocacy, and community education (Id.). Second, paralegals should aim to “achieve 
concrete solutions to people's justice problems” (Id., italics in original). Third, paralegals should 
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“make use of the law” to inform both state and non-state dispute resolution (Id.). Finally, 
paralegals should be “connected to lawyers and litigation” in some way (Id.).  
 
The ASF and Asia Foundation paralegal programs meet these criteria.  The paralegals were lay 
people drawn from their local communities and selected with the aim that they were well-
respected and committed to the programs’ goals of increasing access to justice for all citizens but 
particularly the poor and disadvantaged. Paralegals were given educational opportunities in both 
skills and legal knowledge alongside other forms of assistance. Paralegals actively sought to be 
solution oriented and solve clients’ problems. Paralegals could refer cases to the state justice 
system. Paralegals’ activities linked with partner organization and were subject to monitoring 
and evaluation. In other words, international-donor-funded paralegal initiatives in Timor-Leste 
“elucidate the features of a larger class of similar phenomena” (Gerring 2004: 341). 
 
There are additional reasons paralegal programs in Timor-Leste make compelling case studies. 
Paralegals responded to an important societal need and thus had the potential to make a 
significant impact. Even at the end of the case study period in 2012, state judicial capacity 
remained modest and the reach of state courts limited. Most disputes were resolved outside state 
courts so there was an opportunity for paralegals to meaningfully engage both state and non-state 
justice actors. Furthermore, programs enjoyed substantial autonomy in how they were designed 
and executed. As the goals of the paralegal programs were broadly consistent with government 
policy, state officials accepted the initiatives and by and large did not seek to interfere with their 
day-to-day operation. Thus, state policy did not prevent them from being effective or determine 
program outcomes. Finally, both programs were successful in producing at least modest gains 
towards developing the rule of law. While ‘success’ is invariably a contentious concept, in this 
article success is defined as whether programs have enhanced the prospects for developing and 
consolidating the rule of law.
4
 The case studies’ implications are particularly compelling because 
they highlight how all paralegal programs must contend with these systemic challenges, which 
are not isolated to unsuccessful programs.  
 
This article examines the political economy of paralegal programs by assessing them in light of 
relevant social, political, and economic factors. It draws upon extensive primary and secondary 
sources, personal experience, and in-country fieldwork. Primary sources include donor and 
implementation program reports. The research draws on insights gained from living and working 
in Timor-Leste from 2010 to 2012 with direct knowledge of how the paralegal program operated. 
It also reflects fieldwork conducted in 2014 and 2017, including over 40 interviews conducted 
with relevant state officials, non-state justice actors, local and international NGOs, donors, and 
paralegals. 
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Figure 1: Map of Timor-Leste (Central Intelligence Agency 2017) 
 
IV. Timor-Leste Historical Overview 
 
Prior to its independence in 2002, Timor-Leste (formerly known as East Timor) never operated 
under a modern state legal system with even a limited commitment to the rule of law (Grenfell 
2009: 216).
5
 East Timor was a Portuguese colony since the early sixteenth century. Outside the 
capital and a few coastal areas where colonists exercised direct control, pre-existing political and 
social authorities maintained some autonomy while allying with Portuguese colonizers 
(Robinson 2009: 25). The emphasis on maintaining order by administration at the village (also 
known as a suco) level persisted until Portugal’s withdrawal in the mid-1970s (Nixon 2012: 31-
35). On November 28, 1975, the majority Fretilin party declared independence. Within weeks 
Indonesia had successfully invaded East Timor. In a country of less than one million, the 
occupation led to the deaths of up to 200,000 people (Nevins 2005: 26). Nevertheless, an 
effective independence movement emerged that drew on both domestic opposition and 
international advocacy for sovereignty. Following the onset of the Asian financial crisis, new 
leadership in Indonesia agreed to public consultation, which functionally served as a referendum 
on East Timorese independence in August 1999. Despite intimidation from the Indonesian-
backed militias, 98.4 percent of eligible voters participated with 78.5 percent supporting 
independence. After the vote, pro-integrationist militias unleashed a systematic wave of violence 
that brought international condemnation and ultimately international peacekeepers. The UN 
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oversaw East Timor’s transition to full sovereignty from October 1999 to May 2002.  
 
Despite widespread popular support for independence, deep structural impediments to a lasting 
democratic transition with strong rule of law existed. In terms of economic development, human 
resources, poverty levels, and lack of physical infrastructure, Timor-Leste faced profound 
challenges (Hill 2001). State institutions present under Indonesian rule had ceased to function or, 
often even exist. East Timorese legal professionals had not been permitted to serve as 
prosecutors or judges during Indonesia’s occupation. There were no domestic universities. By 
the time Indonesian forces departed, “all court equipment, furniture, registers, records and 
archives, … law books, cases files, and other legal resources were lost or burned” (Strohmeyer 
2001: 50). When East Timor achieved independence on May 20, 2002, it still faced immense 
human resource challenges and lacked a high capacity, impartial justice system.
6
 Timor-Leste 
also faced a major political upheaval in 2006, which began with military grievances against the 
state and escalated into an outbreak of violent confrontation resulting in over 30 deaths and the 
displacement of 150,000 people (Lothe and Peake 2010). UN troops returned to Timor-Leste to 
restore order in July 2006 and stayed until 2012.  
 
State Justice in Independent Timor-Leste 
 
The newly independent state of Timor-Leste could be characterized as “low capacity but high 
legitimacy” (Call 2008: 1496). Structurally, Timor-Leste became a civil law country closely 
modeled on its initial colonizer Portugal where courts are conceptualized as independent from 
the executive branch (RDTL 2002: Section 119). In practical terms, the country’s judiciary 
underwent rapid “Timorization,” which emphasized hiring indigenous personnel, an approach 
that won praise from commentators (Beauvais 2001). Yet this strategy also raised difficulties 
because local judicial actors were inexperienced and needed extensive training.  In 2004, the 
Legal Training Centre (LTC) was established to oversee the training and professional 
certification of all judges, prosecutors, and public defenders (RDTL 2004a). After the passage of 
the Private Lawyers Law in 2008, the LTC began training private-sector lawyers (RDTL 2008). 
By the end of 2012, the LTC had produced a significant number of prosecutors, public defenders 
and private lawyers. By then, the judicial system was staffed almost exclusively with Timorese 
judges and courts operated reliably across Dili, Baucau, Suai, and Oeccusse. Paralegals, 
however, were unregulated except insofar as they were bound by the same laws as all private 
citizens. 
 
Institutional challenges remained as of 2012. The Supreme Court had yet to be established. 
Courts were still backlogged. Case resolution was time-consuming and often confusing. Women 
continued to face structural discrimination even within the state legal system (Niner 2011). 
While the Constitution provides for the right to an attorney, legal representation could be hard to 
acquire, particularly for those located outside urban centers or facing economic hardship (RDTL 
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2002: Article 34). Public Defenders were known to ask for payment and were frequently accused 
of being excessively interested in profit (Local Development Professional 2014). The number of 
educational establishments offering law degrees grew, but the quality was often poor as higher 
education was very lightly regulated. Despite admirable progress, Timor-Leste still lacked a 
high-capacity modern state justice system in 2012. 
 
Non-State Justice in Timor-Leste 
 
While always a powerful force, the transition from independence further strengthened the non-
state justice system’s legitimacy and reach. Given that non-state justice varies dramatically from 
region to region, and even suco to suco, it is very difficult to generalize. Nevertheless, certain 
core facets exist when the non-state justice system operated along traditional lines: 
 
The process of applying indigenous law starts with a report of the issue to the village or hamlet 
chiefs (depending on the level on which the conflict or the crime occurred) by the heads of the 
families involved in the conflict, or the family of the victim. The ‘helper’ takes note and reports to 
the ‘local legal authorities’, such as the lian nain. The lian nain know the history and are in contact 
with the ancestors. They come from specific families that are the ‘owner of the words’. They know 
the rules the ancestors have set and, therefore, they have the competence to speak the law (Hohe 
2003: 343). 
 
A mutually agreeable time for the dispute resolution process would be set shortly thereafter, 
often by the suco chief. The process would involve structured discussions, testimony, and 
negotiations before reaching a final decision. 
 
While its practice varied significantly by location, non-state justice consistently promoted 
compensation and reconciliation rather than punishment. Non-state justice prioritized 
communitarian rather than individualistic values. Consequently, even if a state court convicted 
someone of a crime, the matter was not necessarily resolved locally. Certain disputes, however, 
were recognized as outside the suco system’s jurisdiction, most notably significant crimes 
involving bloodshed. Compensation sought to right the wrong and could involve exchange of 
money, livestock, land and other goods and services. Once appropriate compensation had been 
determined, suco processes then promoted reconciliation in an attempt to restore communal 
harmony (Babo-Soares 2004: 23). While the suco justice process in Timor-Leste has often been 
cast as mediation, it was more akin to arbitration as the social pressure to accept a decision can 
be intense (Tilman 2012).  
 
In independent Timor-Leste, non-state justice still handled the vast majority of disputes although 
the system has changed significantly with the introduction of competitive elections for suco 
councils (Swenson 2018). Non-state justice was mainly administered by suco councils and took 
on both strong de jure and de facto qualities. The Constitution explicitly declared, “The State 
shall recognize and value the norms and customs of East Timor that are not contrary to the 
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Constitution” or relevant state legislation (RDTL 2002: Section 2.1). While suco authorities 
performed some state-like functions, state officials did not consider them state actors (RDTL 
Ministry of State Administration and Asia Foundation 2013). The elected role of suco chief and 
suco council was initially codified in 2004 (RDTL 2004b), critically shifting the provenance of 
its authority from one primarily rooted in ancestral legitimacy to one rooted in democratic 
legitimacy. Under the 2009 Community Authorities Law, suco chiefs could resolve “minor 
disputes involving two or more of the suco’s villages” (RDTL 2009a: Article 11.2(b)). The 
legislation likewise sought to promote gender equality and broader societal representation 
through quotas in the state-regulated suco elections. It stipulated that there be at least two female 
representatives on the council and two youth representatives (one male and one female) (RDTL 
2009a: Article 5). 
 
 
Forum Source of 
Authority 
Nature of Process Binding? 
State Courts State laws and 
regulations 
Formal judicial 
procedure 
Yes 
Suco Dispute 
Resolution 
Process 
Social status and 
cultural norms  
Arbitration Yes, but depends 
on the nature of 
the community 
Paralegal Dispute 
Resolution 
Processes  
Ability to persuade Mediation No 
 
Figure 2: Nature of Authority in Different Dispute Resolution Forums 
 
 
 
 V. Major Paralegal Aid Programs in Timor-Leste 
 
Given the strong legal pluralism in Timor-Leste and the state courts’ limited capacity, paralegals 
faced an environment rich with opportunities and challenges. This section looks at the two 
largest paralegal programs in Timor-Leste, the Avocats Sans Frontières’ (ASF) Grassroots 
Justice Project from 2005 to 2007 and the Asia Foundation’s Access to Justice paralegal program 
from 2008 to 2012. While distinct, the programs shared some important goals. First, both 
programs aimed to improve access to state legal services, which was seen as more progressive 
than the non-state justice system. Second, the initiatives supported community dispute resolution, 
which was seen as beneficial to the development of the rule of law in Timor-Leste. Third, 
paralegal aid was seen as a way to bolster constructive engagement and choice between the 
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services of the state and non-state justice systems. Finally, at the community level, paralegals 
were charged with increasing local knowledge about international norms on human rights and 
equal treatment of men and women.   
 
 
Funder Number of 
Paralegals 
Number of 
Female 
Paralegals 
Number in 
Suco 
Leadership 
Roles  
Compensated Districts 
Covered 
ASF 110 26 110 No Cova Lima, 
Baucau, and 
Liquisa 
Asia 
Foundatio
n 
29 Varied, 
usually around 
30% or more 
4 Yes Baucau, 
Manatuto, 
Viqueque, 
Los Palos, 
and 
Oeccusse 
 
Figure 3:  Key Characteristics of Timor-Leste’s Paralegal Programs’ Structures 
 
Avocats Sans Frontières’ Grassroots Justice Project, 2005-2007 
 
ASF operated a Grassroots Justice Project from 2005 to 2007 that established a network of 
paralegals
 
in three of Timor-Leste’s thirteen districts, specifically Cova Lima, Baucau, and 
Liquisa.
7
 ASF implemented the program with three local legal aid partners, (i) Centro 
Informasaun da Edukasaun Sivika (CIES TL) in Baucau; (ii) Fundacao Espinhos da Rosa 
(FEDAROS) in Liquisa; and (iii) Fundacao KYNTA in Suai. While the program was funded by 
the Royal Danish Embassy based in Jakarta at a level of USD $678,100, the initiative envisioned 
volunteerism as essential for program sustainability once donor funding ceased. Consequently, 
all paralegals were volunteers (Low 2007: 6).  
 
The project sought to promote the development of a legal system that “provides real protection 
for the population,” “increase[s] respect for… fundamental human rights,” and advances “real 
rule of law and democratic culture” (ASF 2004: 3). The specific project objectives involved: (1) 
creating “a paralegal-like network amongst selected community leaders in rural communities”; 
(2) building selected community leaders’ capacity through imparting “basic knowledge of laws 
and its procedures” and of legal “mechanisms of protection” as well as equipping them with 
“skills to provide legal information, education and guidance to rural communities”; (3) providing 
rural communities with “information on the justice system,” “thus increasing their knowledge of 
their rights and obligations as citizens under the rule of law in a democratic society”; (4) 
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improving access to “formal justice,” by providing information and linking to government-
provided legal and social services; and (5) increasing women’s access to justice “by providing 
information to community leaders on women’s issues and gender sensitivity” (Id.). 
 
In practice, the parameters of program activities were clearly delineated by state officials (ASF 
actively sought state support) and non-state justice actors. In 2005, the Deputy Minister of 
Justice made it clear that the program had the ministry’s approval to engage in all legal areas 
except customary law and ASF followed this instruction (Clarke 2011: 20).
8
 Paralegal candidates 
were “selected from among respected village, youth, women, church, and traditional leaders” 
(ASF 2009: 6). While characterized as neutral, independent parties, all 110 selectees were deeply 
enmeshed in their communities’ existing power structures. As Low noted during her 
comprehensive program evaluation, “42 are villages chiefs, 23 are women leaders, 8 are hamlet 
(aldeia), and 19 are youth leaders” holding elected positions and the remaining 18 were 
unelected suco council members (Low 2007: 13-14). Rather than working directly with the local 
suco justice system to build their capacity, the ASF program sought to use paralegals to establish 
a distinct approach to developing justice capacity by using volunteers to run community 
mediation processes apart from the formal state or traditional suco processes. However, in reality 
this approach was tightly integrated with the suco justice system given that the paralegals chosen 
were already active suco leaders. The program therefore simply bolstered pre-existing suco 
leaders and processes.  
 
The Asia Foundation’s Access to Justice Program, 2008-2012 
 
From 2002 to 2012, the Asia Foundation’s Access to Justice program, funded by the United 
States Agency for International Development, sought to promote wider access to, and improved 
performance of, the justice sector. The program did not include a paralegal component until 
2008. While initially almost exclusively focused on state justice, after the 2006 Crisis “the 
program’s priorities shifted to serving as a bridge between formal justice sector institutions… 
and informal dispute resolution mechanisms” as engagement with customary justice became a 
major state priority (Asia Foundation 2012: 11). Consequently, paralegal assistance that engaged 
directly with local non-state justice emerged as a strategic priority in order to bridge the two 
justice systems and serve as a conduit for education and outreach. 
 
In 2008, the Asia Foundation began a full-scale paralegal initiative building off of a pilot 
internship program (Asia Foundation 2009: 24-26).  Aimed broadly at expanding the reach of 
legal services, the initiative had six main objectives: (1) expanding “access to legal  aid  
services” across five districts, including in remote areas; (2) improving outreach through suco 
level paralegals; (3) identifying, assisting in contacting, referring to legal aid organizations, and 
updating paralegals’ clients; (4) sharing information on “judicial processes and the law” with 
“community leaders and members”; (5) assisting “local  authorities  in  resolving  civil  cases  
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through  mediation” that is principally neutral and non-discriminatory;  and, (6) increasing “the  
number  of  civil  matters  resolved  at  village  level  through  mediation” (Coghlan and Hayati 
2012: 32). 
 
Donors and program administrators realized that non-state actors often had little knowledge of 
state laws. After a wholesale program evaluation in 2010, the Asia Foundation undertook a 
comprehensive training program for paralegals to make sure they understood the most important 
aspects of applicable state law and to instill core skills. The Asia Foundation also sought to 
ensure that suco dispute resolution was generally consistent with broad due process and human 
rights norms. 
 
All paralegals operated under the supervision of local legal aid organizations, either Fundasaun 
Edukasaun Comunidade Matebian (ECM) or Fatu Sinai Oecusse (FFSO). ECM covered the 
districts of Baucau, Manatuto, Viqueque, and Los Palos with 18 paralegals, four of which also 
served as suco chiefs. FFSO operated in the Oecusse district and oversaw 11 paralegals (Asia 
Foundation 2012: 29). Both ECM and FFSO offered individuals unfamiliar with state justice 
information and referral mechanisms or assistance with the suco dispute resolution process. 
ECM paralegals were empowered to resolve minor disputes themselves when both parties 
consented. Thus, ECM paralegals did constitute a dispute resolution forum distinct from state 
and suco justice systems. In contrast, FFSO paralegals were prohibited from resolving such 
disputes themselves. 
 
VI. Program Accomplishments 
 
ASF and Asia Foundation funded paralegals achieved numerous successes in line with the 
expectations of paralegal assistance proponents. In both programs, paralegals reached remote 
areas where professional legal services and legal aid lawyers did not routinely access. During the 
four years of active Asia Foundation programming, paralegals assisted with 3,110 cases “with 38 
percent of this number (or 1026 clients) being female” (Asia Foundation 2012: 29). Under the 
ASF program, participants reported that “between December 2005 and January 2007,” paralegals 
addressed “146 disputes… and of these 109 have involved mediation” (Low 2007: 15). In both 
instances, paralegal-aided dispute resolution tended to be notably quicker than state courts. These 
outcomes suggest that paralegal programs did increase access to justice in their targeted 
communities for some people.  
 
Paralegals provided information on the state and suco justice processes. In ECM’s case, they 
directly resolved disputes. Asia Foundation paralegals performed community outreach about the 
availability of donor-funded legal aid lawyers. These lawyers handled certain civil and criminal 
matters and facilitated referral of more serious criminal matters to the state court system for 
prosecution. One example of the program’s success is that all 18 suco chiefs in the remote 
district of Oeccusse stated that Asia Foundation funded paralegals were their only link to the 
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state justice system and the police (Graydon 2011: 33). When using paralegals to bolster state 
justice capacity, underwriting paralegal salaries cost less than underwriting those of legal aid 
lawyers, in a sense fulfilling the promise to be cost-effective.
9
 Paralegal assistance, particularly 
when coupled with free professional legal services, increased access to state courts. 
 
Paralegals offered advice and technical assistance to help make non-state justice processes fairer 
and more respectful of basic human rights norms, most notably seeking to ensure rudimentary 
forms of due process and equality before the law. However, there was no demonstrable evidence 
that the presence of paralegals actually changed the operations of suco disputes to make them 
more equitable or gender-sensitive (Low 2007; Interview with International Development 
Professional 2014). Paralegal assistance programs in Timor-Leste fulfilled some of their 
promise. Paralegals could resolve disputes or advise on their local processes, particularly in 
remote or previously inaccessible locations, as well as refer cases to state courts and streamline 
administration of non-state processes. 
 
 
Program Referral to 
State Courts? 
Assist with 
Suco Dispute 
Resolution 
Processes? 
Direct 
Mediation? 
Community 
Outreach? 
ASF Yes No No Yes 
Asia 
Foundation 
through ECM 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Asia 
Foundation 
through FFSO 
Yes Yes No Yes 
 
Figure 4: Activities Undertaken in Timor-Leste Paralegal Aid Programs 
 
Program Constraints, Challenges, and Implications  
 
Both the ASF and Asia Foundation programs achieved notable, if modest, advances in promoting 
access to justice. However, close examination of these programs highlights how even successful, 
well-designed programs face significant and systemic programming challenges, including those 
related to principal-agent issues, internal and external constraints on paralegals, program 
structure, implementation, and sustainability. While the discussion focuses on Timor-Leste, all 
paralegal assistance programs would need to confront at least some of these systemic challenges. 
 
Principal-Agent Issues  
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Paralegals face unclear and overlapping lines of accountability. In Timor-Leste, as with many 
countries, paralegals worked under the oversight of international donors, international program 
implementers, and local NGOs. At the same time, they were expected to respond to third parties 
such as suco chiefs, local clients, and state officials, even though they were not state agents and 
often not part of the non-state justice system. Paralegals were expected to act independently of 
state and local power structures, while at the same time bolstering access to the state justice 
systems and improving how non-state justice functions.  
 
 
  Donor (Principal) 
  ↓  
  International NGO (Agent of donor; Principal 
of local partner NGO) 
  ↓  
  Local NGO (Agent of international 
NGO and donor; Principal 
of paralegals) 
  ↓  
Also subject to third party 
influence of suco chiefs, 
state officials, and local 
clients. 
→ Paralegals (Agent of local NGO, 
international NGO, and 
donor) 
 
Figure 5: Principal-Agent Relationships in Paralegal Aid 
 
 
From an organizational theory perspective, paralegals raise significant and complex principal-
agent incentive issues (Laffont and Martimort 2002), such as those raised by the structure of 
donor accountability. Donors fund paralegal programs to achieve rule of law and access to 
justice objectives, but do not seek to implement programming themselves. In practice, donors 
usually delegate activities to implementing organizations, which in this case were the 
international NGOs ASF and the Asia Foundation. Implementing NGOs often then delegate 
work in a specific area to a local NGO partner, such as the legal aid organizations ECM and 
FSSO contracted by the Asia Foundation or CIES TL, FEDAROS, and KYNTA contracted by 
ASF. This reflects a belief that the local partner has superior local knowledge and capacity. 
Local partners additionally delegate by contracting with paralegals. Delegation at any level of 
contracting involves high agency and transaction costs because the principal’s control 
mechanisms are weak and information disparities are high (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Donors, 
implementing international NGOs, legal aid organizations, and paralegals all have distinct 
incentive structures (Gent, Crescenzi et al. 2015). At each level, the principals have limited 
ability to undertake the systematic monitoring and evaluation vital for mitigating their principal-
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agent issues.  
 
Principals did implement a credible, robust monitoring and evaluation regime. Donors required 
implementing international NGOs to make routine, detailed reports and implementing 
international NGOs required partner legal aid organizations to do the same. There were also 
attempts to reach down the chain in monitoring and evaluating. Under the Asia Foundation 
program, ECM and FSSO organized monthly staff meetings that mandated paralegals’ 
attendance to report on their activities, receive updates and answer questions. The Asia 
Foundation representatives usually attended these events to further improve accountability of 
both paralegals and legal aid organizations. The Asia Foundation, ECM and FSSO all undertook 
spot checks of paralegals’ assigned locations as well.  
 
Nevertheless, due to information asymmetries, program size, limited resources and staff time for 
monitoring, and the remoteness of where paralegals worked, knowledge gaps remained. It was 
impossible to know with certainty how each individual dispute was being resolved and how 
paralegals performed on a day-to-day basis. Consequently, while monitoring sufficiently ensured 
certain outputs, such as if paralegals were carrying out their essential duties, determining more 
precise realities (for example, what exactly occurred in each dispute resolution, how consistent it 
was with human rights norms, or what exactly the paralegal’s relationship was with the local 
community and suco council) was very difficult.  
 
Client confidentiality requirements further compounded monitoring issues. Both ASF and the 
Asia Foundation worked to protect client anonymity (Low 2007: 29, Interview with Local 
International Development Professional 2014). While these protections were essential to respect 
the sensitive nature of disputes, they exacerbated information asymmetries between paralegals 
and the parties monitoring their activities by limiting monitors’ ability to directly engage with 
participants. While legal aid organizations and international NGO representatives would 
sometimes monitor dispute resolution processes as they occurred, they were only allowed to 
attend with permission of the parties. 
  
Principal-agent issues are intractable in development assistance and must be managed rather than 
eliminated. Nevertheless, “norms can embed the interests of the principal allowing the agent to 
significantly reduce the problem,” as Fukuyama explains (Fukuyama 2004: 65), citing the 
example of teachers going above and beyond their contractual requirements to provide an 
excellent education for their students. Paralegal aid programs were predicated on an implicit 
assumption that paralegals were motivated primarily by a desire to improve their community. 
While paralegals took their duties seriously, they did not fully internalize donors’ priorities (Low 
2007; Asia Foundation 2012). From a political economy perspective, paralegals needed to 
balance donor priorities with those of external third parties, including local and state justice 
authorities and international and local NGOs, in order to execute their job responsibilities. 
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Suco leaders serving as paralegals did not face the same issues of third party influence from the 
non-state justice sector. However, they were not independent of the suco justice system. In 
reality, they were essential actors in the pre-existing non-state justice sector. The ASF program 
explicitly selected “community leaders (paralegals) who are in a position of authority to 
influence and impact their communities” and who were therefore already deeply involved in 
local dispute resolutions (ASF 2004: 9). Yet, in these instances, paralegals could not be 
considered an independent source of authority offering unrestricted access to the state legal 
sector. Rather, paralegal assistance reinforced the existing power structure. Suco leaders who 
served as paralegals in the Asia Foundation program explicitly stated that one of their primary 
motivations was to become more effective suco authorities (Interview with Program Manager 
2014). The dualism of roles among paralegals limited the ability of donors and NGOs to 
influence their behavior as they were imbued with independent sources of legitimacy stemming 
from their suco leadership role and electoral mandate. 
 
Internal Constraints on Paralegals  
 
The paralegal’s role raises issues regarding their authority and independence. The paralegal role 
had no inherent authority bestowed by either state law or social custom. Thus, it was distinct 
from suco processes and state law, which both enjoy the capacity to make binding decisions. 
Unless already holding a place in the suco hierarchy, paralegals resolved disputes based on their 
own standing in the community, the prestige of associating with an international NGO, or some 
combination of the two. Moreover, disputants voluntarily chose to employ a paralegal for dispute 
resolution and could disregard the paralegal’s decision without consequence. Therefore, the 
processes were akin to mediation and the effectiveness of the resolution ultimately relied on the 
paralegal’s persuasiveness.  Any legal system, including non-state systems, cannot merely rely 
on persuading parties to consent to making a binding decision. If a legal system could only 
resolve disputes when there is total consent by the parties, then rule breakers could simply 
withhold their consent to participate. Even if all parties give consent initially, one party could 
just refuse to effectuate the agreement and there would be no mechanism for enforcement. Legal 
systems, at a minimum, require not only the authority to make determinations with regards to 
competing interests but also some capacity to enforce their rules on those who fail to comply 
(Raz 2009). This is what distinguishes a legal system from a mediation system. 
 
Paralegals in practice operate in a highly constrained, contingent space. When paralegals resolve 
disputes themselves, parties to the dispute must accept their decisions for the matter to be 
considered resolved. Their decisions must also be at least tacitly accepted by powerful state and 
non-state justice actors. These challenges are particularly acute when paralegals seek to “advance 
human rights or women’s rights agendas that run contrary to entrenched cultural or religious 
norms” (Tamanaha 2011b: 17).  For example, this reality did not go unrecognized in deciding 
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whether to create a paralegal program among the Asia Foundation’s programming portfolio, 
where evaluators highlighted “that certain etiquette needs to be observed to maintain good 
relations with the village leadership if alternative forms of dispute resolution are explored and 
created” (Chopra, Pologruto, and de Deus 2009: 14). The generalized notion of paralegals being 
transcendent actors, not to mention a check against human rights abuses or other practices 
deemed undesirable, should be viewed with skepticism. Certain paralegals may function with a 
high degree of autonomy and legitimate authority, but this exists on a case by case basis and 
cannot simply be assumed. 
 
Forum Shopping and Shopping Forums  
 
Trained paralegals in legally pluralist settings facilitate a dynamic whereby “contestants tend to 
‘shop’ for forums for dispute resolution, and forums actively shop for disputes in an effort to 
consolidate their authority” (Sikor and Lund 2009: 10). In Timor-Leste, this dynamic is 
confirmed by evidence that paralegals who also held community posts sought to use their stature 
and authority as paralegals, its access to training, and the other support it entails to bolster their 
authority in the community (Low 2007: 13-15). Enhancing the ability of disputants to select 
resolution forums might improve overall justice administration services for a community by 
pushing all sides to offer the best possible service. This competition between state and suco 
justice mechanisms could be especially beneficial for individuals who were disadvantaged by the 
suco justice system, most notably women or economically vulnerable community members. 
However, increasing access to state courts does not come without its potential downsides. State 
courts could still favor those with more resources to dedicate to the proceedings (a situation 
highly likely in resolving civil matters) and just because a matter is resolved by state courts does 
not necessarily mean it is resolved locally. The existence of multiple justice forums can 
significantly disadvantage less powerful parties as those with the most resources and other 
advantages are able to work to ensure access to the most favorable venue.   
 
These issues can be further compounded by creating a new, third dispute resolution forum in the 
form of a network of independent paralegals resolving disputes in isolation from the state and 
suco justice systems, such as ECM paralegals authorized by donors to resolve disputes 
themselves. These new forums risk further confusing an already crowded legal landscape and 
increase the potential for forum shopping. 
 
External Constraints by State and Non-State Authorities on Paralegals 
 
A well-functioning paralegal program requires tacit, and often explicit, consent from state and 
non-state justice authorities. Proponents stress that paralegals should be drawn from the 
communities they serve, the logic being that local paralegals’ proximity and experience gives 
them a greater understanding of how processes in their communities operate both formally and 
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informally. This led their proponents to conclude that paralegals are ideally situated to navigate 
the village’s legal, social, and political landscape. Yet paralegals were deeply embedded in the 
areas they served, presenting a paradox.  Often paralegals’ families were based in their 
communities. Unless paralegals sought other opportunities in Dili or a regional hub such as 
Baucau, they would remain in their local villages after the program ceased. Indeed, the notion of 
paralegal program sustainability assumed that they would not move.  
 
If the paralegals were firmly rooted in their communities then they would have powerful pre-
existing relationships and likely preconceived notions about their community. Chopra and Isser, 
while optimistic regarding paralegal aid, noted there “is a lack of empirical evidence of the 
impact paralegals may have on local power structures” to promote progressive change in areas 
such as women’s rights (Chopra and Isser 2012: 355). This dynamic was present in paralegal 
programs in Timor-Leste. Even when not formally a part of the local power structure, paralegals 
tended to bolster, rather than challenge, existing social and political power arrangements. FFSO 
paralegals in Oeccusse, for instance, served primarily as helpers of the local suco chiefs. They 
acted on their chiefs’ instruction and were routinely tasked with activities such as ensuring that 
the parties to the dispute knew the date, time, and location of the suco dispute resolution 
processes. Paralegals cannot truly be autonomous to their community and its dominant power 
structure. Therefore, the idea that they could easily transcend their surroundings is highly 
optimistic.    
 
While not particularly interested in the everyday operations of programming, the state influenced 
international initiatives by stipulating key overarching goals. International programs sought buy-
in from state authorities to undertake programming and the state usually retained, and frequently 
exercised, the right to influence international programming. This dynamic is demonstrated by 
ASF’s experience whereby “project content was significantly shaped by the need to respect the 
policies of the government of Timor Leste” with regards to non-state justice (Low 2007:44). The 
Asia Foundation sought to respond to prominent state officials’ belief that effective international 
engagement of the non-state justice sector was essential for long-term stability after the 2006 
Crisis (International Legal Professional 2014). Therefore, the implemented paralegal programs 
remained firmly within the state’s vision of law and development and worked most efficiently 
when following those trends.
10
  
 
Program Design, Implementation, and Sustainability Challenges  
 
Apart from internal and external constraints, paralegal programs face design and implementation 
issues stemming from paralegals’ position as intermediaries between state and non-state justice. 
Challenges related to management and staffing as well as obstacles to achieving key program 
goals, most notably program sustainability and addressing violence against women, are examined 
below.   
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Legal Aid Partnerships 
 
Partnerships with community based NGOs, such as legal aid organizations, offer compelling 
administrative and practical benefits for paralegal initiatives by facilitating referrals for serious 
crimes, enhancing program oversight, and providing the legal expertise that paralegals lack. 
Legal aid organizations or other local NGOs can help manage paralegals and serve as an 
umbrella for training and other collective endeavors.   
 
These partnerships can, however, generate their own challenges. While no paralegals were 
accused of wrongdoing, programming had to be paused due to separate financial improprieties at 
both ECM and FFSO (Coghlan and Hayati 2012: 9). Of ASF’s three local partnerships, those 
with KYNTA and FEDAROS were terminated in 2006 due to financial irregularities (Low 2007: 
2010). In short, local NGOs can help manage and coordinate paralegal activities in remote areas 
far from where the international NGO and donors are based, but it is a challenge to find a 
credible, trustworthy and high-capacity local NGO partner. Paralegal program design and 
implementation must be attuned not only to the structure of the paralegal program itself but also 
to its partnerships with legal aid organizations.  
 
Human Resources 
 
Paralegal programs face significant human resources challenges. Many of the roles performed by 
professional lawyers cannot be supplanted by paralegals. Paralegals have less education; a more 
limited knowledge of relevant state laws; lower levels, if any, of professional certification; and 
cannot engage in state criminal or civil judicial processes. These challenges are particularly acute 
in post-conflict societies such as Timor-Leste where, due to conflict and external occupation, the 
nascent state lacked a professional class. Timor-Leste’s entire state legal system had to be 
constructed from scratch after independence. All pre-existing lawyers trained in Indonesia had to 
be recertified through the LTC.  
 
The pool of paralegal candidates, while almost uniformly well-intentioned, consistently lacked 
key skills, making recruitment of quality staff challenging. The Asia Foundation offered 
paralegals compensation, which broadened their candidate pool, though staffing remained a 
challenge. In contrast, ASF recruited only volunteers in pre-existing positions of authority to 
serve as paralegals. While this approach ensured paralegals enjoyed local legitimacy, it raises 
questions over the extent of their independence and neutrality. In general, paralegals were eager 
to learn more about state law and other relevant topics. Yet even though ASF and the Asia 
Foundation undertook training that improved paralegals’ knowledge, serious information and 
skill gaps remained. 
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Gender Equity 
 
Human resource challenges were particularly acute in the recruitment and retention of women 
paralegals. Gender diversity among paralegals and their clients was a major donor priority.  
While the ASF program had 26 women paralegals, literacy and community standing 
requirements were persistent obstacles to recruiting and retaining female paralegals (Low 
2007:22-23). The Asia Foundation initiative explicitly set a goal that at least 26 percent of the 
program’s beneficiaries and paralegals, and ideally a greater percentage, should be female. Yet 
some clients did not feel comfortable with a female paralegal handling their dispute. Another 
hurdle was that paralegals were routinely asked to travel significant distances. Female paralegals 
generally did not feel comfortable traveling on their own, and so small payments, dubbed 
‘cigarette money,’ would be required to compensate for the cost of a male relative traveling with 
the female paralegal.   
 
Compensation 
 
Differences between the ASF and Asia Foundation programs are analytically illustrative as ASF 
was a voluntary program while the Asia Foundation was a compensated one. The issue of 
paralegal pay was contentious. Some observers were concerned that payment would attract 
candidates motivated by profit rather than duty. For example, Asia Foundation evaluators 
highlighted the “risk that if mediators are initially paid, then this sets a precarious precedent and 
may attract people who have no sincere desire to help their communities” (Chopra, Pologruto, 
and de Deus 2009: 16). While this concern may be justified, it is necessary to weigh paralegals’ 
ideological commitment to program ideals against the time and effort they are expected to invest. 
Paralegals are required to resolve disputes, conduct outreach, assist with suco dispute processes, 
and continue their training. Without payment, only those who are independently wealthy or 
cannot secure paid employment could be paralegals. Current suco officials, for example, were 
often happy to volunteer as paralegals. This is not particularly surprising as the paralegal role 
offered increased status and authority. Nevertheless, voluntary work also places distinct limits on 
the extent of commitment that can reasonably be expected of paralegals, even from those who 
benefit from the role and have a meaningful commitment to it. Indeed, this is what happened 
with ASF as all the paralegals were already in the local governance structure (Low 2007: 13-14). 
A volunteer program can severely hinder the retention of paralegals over time.  
 
Paying paralegals presents its own set of obstacles. Establishing the appropriate compensation 
equilibrium for paralegals is challenging. If paralegals are not paid sufficiently, there are few 
incentives to dedicate substantial time and energy to the post. Excessive compensation could 
provoke resentment locally. Community input is considered when selecting paralegals, although 
this risks the role becoming a patronage post for powerful local interests. Moreover, regardless of 
the level of remuneration, payment can increase dependency on donors or state funding. 
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Ultimately, compensation involves inevitable trade-offs. Paying paralegals allows for more 
independence from the community, increases the scope of work that can be expected, and 
broadens the population able to serve as paralegals. At the same time, compensation makes 
paralegal programs highly dependent on state or donor funds and may make the paralegal role 
attractive primarily for its economic rewards. 
 
Program Sustainability 
 
International and domestic NGOs are usually unwilling or unable to undertake activities absent 
donor support (Cooley and Ron 2002). Consequently, paralegal programs seek to have a 
sustainable, ongoing impact once donor support ends by developing skills that paralegals can use 
indefinitely. ASF in particular emphasized that its program was sustainable because the 
paralegals were volunteers rather than employees, so they would not require payment to keep 
working (Low 2007: 40). This belief made sense in theory but was not borne out in practice. 
Once ASF programming ended, the network of established paralegals ceased to operate. The 
former participants with the strongest incentives to continue providing dispute resolution 
services as paralegals were suco leaders. Due to suco leaders’ pre-existing arbitration role in the 
community, this hardly amounts to a continuation of the paralegal program; rather, it is more 
akin to a return to pre-existing practices. Additionally, if the suco leaders trained as paralegals 
were not re-elected as suco leaders, they had little incentive to continue in their new role (Low 
2007: 40). Similarly, Asia Foundation-funded paralegals stopped working once the program 
ended. It is possible that paralegals offered advice on an ad hoc basis though there is no 
indication this happened with any regularity.  
 
Addressing Violence Against Women 
 
The suco dispute resolution system often structurally disfavored women. Moreover, suco justice 
traditionally viewed domestic violence against women as a private matter rather than a public 
crime. Paralegal programs aimed to improve women’s rights by promoting gender equity and 
ensuring that state courts rather than the non-state justice system addressed cases of violence 
against women. This provision reflected a strategic policy priority for the national government 
and international donor community, both of whom had invested in eradicating gender-based 
violence. Domestic political elites in Timor-Leste have been open to progressive reform in this 
area. Timor-Leste’s Penal Code unequivocally declared domestic violence a public crime (RDTL 
2009b: Article 146, 154). The Law Against Domestic Violence went further and stipulated 
victims cannot drop their claims once legal proceedings have commenced which substantially 
changed the incentive structure regarding the decision to pursue charges in state courts (RDTL 
2010). These laws transformed domestic violence from a private issue, as it was established in 
state and non-state practice under Portuguese and Indonesian rule, to a public crime.  
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Yet many women still could not access the state justice system or state police simply ignored 
their claims even after relevant state legislation was passed (Campbell and Swenson 2016). Even 
when claims reached state courts, Timor-Leste lacked an adequate state- or privately-run support 
network for victims of domestic violence. Many women risked social ostracism for pursuing 
state legal remedies for abuse. When charges were successfully pursued in state courts and 
perpetrators imprisoned, women often still found themselves “in dire situations in which they 
have no more income, nobody to work their fields and hungry children to feed” (Chopra, 
Pologruto, and de Deus. 2009: 17).  
 
Addressing domestic violence cases often generated tension between state and non-state legal 
orders. While non-state justice actors largely supported the state’s developmental program, 
including the government’s approach to the state justice sector, they were far more circumspect 
in their approach to state-backed reforms regarding the treatment of violence against women 
(Campbell and Swenson 2016). The law envisioned a major role for suco chiefs in “preventing 
domestic violence,” protecting victims, and “punishing the aggressor” in a manner that prevents 
recidivism (RDTL 2009a: Article 11.2(c-d)). While state legislation made gender-based violence 
a public crime, it also tasked non-state justice actors with a leading role in preventing and 
addressing gender-based violence. The data is limited, but existing evidence suggests that despite 
serious investment in the state justice system, the non-state system continued to resolve most 
cases of domestic violence (Wigglesworth 2013). Despite the state-mandated regulatory 
framework, how suco leaders addressed domestic violence remained largely discretionary in 
practice, even in locations with paralegals present.  While paralegals were technically required to 
refer all cases involving gender-based violence to the state courts, paralegals often deferred to 
local authorities in these situations. It was difficult to determine whether referrals were actually 
occurring and referrals of cases involving violence against women to state courts from paralegal 
programs were rare. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Overall Program Impact, Theory Testing and Building Implications, and Further Research 
 
Evidence from Timor-Leste’s two major paralegal programs has implications for future 
programming in the country and beyond. This section considers the lessons from the case studies 
for new initiatives, applies the results from the case studies to theory testing and theory building, 
and highlights avenues for additional research.  
 
On balance, the case studies from Timor-Leste demonstrate that paralegal approaches have the 
potential to increase access to, and capacity of, both the state and non-state justice systems. The 
programs in Timor-Leste created a more fluid relationship between the two systems, even in the 
trying circumstances of a post-conflict country with weak state capacity. Thus, they provide 
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empirical support for the contention that paralegals can advance the rule of law and access to 
justice. However, the scale of impact is more limited than commonly assumed. The case studies 
also show how the ability of programs to overcome the inherent difficulties of promoting access 
to justice and the rule of law has, in many cases, been overstated. The ability of paralegal aid to 
succeed despite significant challenges should be demonstrated rather than simply assumed, as 
has often been the case to date.  
 
From a theory testing perspective, the case studies from Timor-Leste disprove the dominant view 
that paralegal programs can transcend obstacles rooted in pre-existing power structures, whether 
state or non-state. Currently there is insufficient recognition of principal-agent problems inherent 
in paralegal aid. Future programming requires innovative thinking about how paralegals should 
balance the competing interests of state and non-state justice actors rather than ignoring tensions 
between the systems. Certain key goals such as improving human rights standards and treating 
domestic violence as a public crime are unlikely to be advanced by paralegals without support 
from powerful actors in both the state and non-state justice sectors. The case studies suggest that 
when changes do occur, paralegals’ influence on state and non-state justice processes and 
outcomes tends to be incremental rather than transformational. Paralegals’ primary impact is to 
amplify existing justice sector trends rather than create new patterns of behavior.  
 
Conventional wisdom holds that paralegal programs in developing countries are cost-effective, 
sustainable, culturally intelligible, and effective at advancing access to justice. Yet, evidence 
from Timor-Leste highlights this is not necessarily the case. The Timor-Leste programs show 
that while paralegals can work in more remote areas than lawyers, it is very difficult to verify 
how individual cases are handled or the quality of service provided. Moreover, paralegals cannot 
perform the full range of services offered by lawyers. While paralegals may address disputes 
more quickly when acting independently from the state and the suco justice systems, their 
decisions are not binding and thus their intervention may help drag out disputes rather than 
resolve them. Similarly, there is no reason to believe that paralegals are better suited at resolving 
disputes than lawyers due to their connection to local communities due to the issues of 
negotiating existing power structures discussed above. In Timor-Leste at least, paralegal 
programs were no more sustainable than standard legal aid programs or any other donor funded 
initiatives. When donor support ceased, so did paralegal activities.   
 
From a theory building perspective, evidence from Timor-Leste shows that while paralegal 
programs may make a significant, if modest, contribution to promoting access to justice, their 
success tends to depend on the response of powerful state and non-state justice actors. Paralegal 
initiatives in developing countries will face a host of challenges including, but by no means 
limited to, principal-agent issues, the limited nature of paralegals’ authority, and issues of design, 
implementation, and sustainability.  These challenges need to be recognized and addressed. The 
key is not to eliminate these problems, which in most instances is impossible, but rather to 
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acknowledge them and seek to ensure programming can still have a positive, if limited, outcome.  
Rather than transcend local context, successful paralegal approaches must skillfully engage it. 
Consequently, even where programing is successful, inevitable tradeoffs exist and progress is 
likely to be at the margins. 
 
On a more macro level, paralegal programs’ prospects are highly context dependent. When 
populations see the state legal systems as legitimate they are far more likely follow state law 
(Tyler 2006). People favorably disposed to state dispute resolution are far more likely to use 
state-backed dispute resolution when offered access through paralegals. This dynamic also 
makes non-state justice actors who have autonomy more likely to refer matters to state courts but 
also respect state-backed jurisdictional divides and even procedural guidelines within non-state 
justice processes themselves. It is not simply a matter of state courts’ legitimacy and 
effectiveness. Paralegal approaches must be attuned to legal pluralism’s challenges and have a 
coherent vision of how paralegals should navigate the competing demands of different justice 
sector actors.   
 
Legal pluralism, however, can take a variety of forms. Legal pluralism can be combative, 
competitive, cooperative, or complementary with major implications for paralegal programs’ 
prospects (Swenson 2018).  Under combative legal pluralism, state and non-state systems are 
overtly hostile towards one another making paralegal programs unlikely to accomplish their 
goals. With competitive legal pluralism, a dynamic common in many developing counties, “the 
state’s overarching authority is not challenged, but non-state actors retain substantial autonomy” 
(Id.: 7). Competitive non-state legal systems are frequently rooted in religious beliefs or shared 
culture, custom, or heritage and do not necessarily share the state legal system’s values.  These 
are the most common settings and offer promise but also obstacles for paralegal programs. In a 
setting characterized by cooperative legal pluralism, “non-state justice authorities still retain 
significant autonomy and authority” but have “large[ly] accepted the state’s normative 
legitimacy and are generally willing to work together towards shared goals” (Id.: 8). While 
clashes still exist over important areas such as women’s rights, overarching issues of state 
judicial power have been resolved. In these settings, paralegal programs are particularly 
promising. Finally, under complementary legal pluralism, the state enjoys a monopoly on the 
legitimate settlements of legal disputes. Although legal pluralism is still present in mechanisms 
such as arbitration agreements or alternative dispute resolution, these processes operate with at 
least implicit state acceptance or risk effective state repression. In such contexts, paralegals exist 
but do not perform the same functions envisioned under development programs. In the United 
States, for example, paralegals serve primarily as legal assistants to practicing attorneys and 
operate under attorney supervision when performing “substantive legal work” (Statsky 2015: 
15).  
  
Paralegals are no panacea, but they still have the potential to promote access to justice and the 
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rule of law. Paralegal programs, even successful ones as in Timor-Leste, face serious obstacles. 
To date, however, there has been insufficient acknowledgment that paralegal programs face 
inherent problems and constraints that elude technocratic solutions. Moreover, despite the praise 
these programs routinely receive, there is a serious gap in understanding what paralegal 
programs practically entail and their theoretical implications for international efforts promoting 
access to justice and the rule of law in developing countries. Further scholarly research 
examining the conditions of programs’ effectiveness is needed. Areas for future research include 
how the state and non-state justice sectors operate in a given area and their relationship to 
paralegals, particularly in cases where either the state or non-state justice sectors are opposed to 
the program. Other research avenues include a more critical examination of program funding 
structures, management styles and how programs do or do not address intrinsic issues such as 
human resources challenges, principal-agent issues, and internal and external constraints. As 
paralegal programming promises to be a fixture of international development aid for the 
foreseeable future, it is vital scholars, policymakers, and practitioners have a more nuanced 
understanding of these initiatives. 
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1
 The rule of law and access to justice are distinct concepts though often related in practice. Unsurprisingly, the 
rule of law is a contentious concept.  At a minimum, the rule of law requires that “law must be set forth in advance 
(be prospective), be made public, be general, be clear, be stable and certain, and be applied to everyone” 
(Tamanaha, 2007: 3). Other more robust conceptualizations of the rule of law include significant economic, 
cultural, and political requirements (Jensen 2003: 338-340). In turn, access to justice is a concept that speaks 
directly to the idea of equality under the law for everyone, which entails a concern for “both procedural and 
substantive fairness” (Rhode 2009: 872). International paralegal programs usually seek to advance both the rule of 
law and access to justice by making sure that people understand the law, ensuring matters that by state law should 
be resolved in state courts are referred to state courts, and ensuring that all people, but especially vulnerable 
populations, are able to access state courts and protect their legal rights. 
2
 This positive view of paralegals in developing countries also stands in contrast to debates over paralegals’ role in 
developed, high-capacity legal systems, where the use of paralegals has produced controversy for potentially 
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law (Abel 1989, Rhode and Ricca 2014).  
3
 Even commentators skeptical of the commission have lauded its endorsement of paralegals (see e.g. Stephens 
2009: 145). 
4
 This criterion is consistent with the logic of Roland Paris’ influential research on state-building, which examines 
whether international state-building efforts have “enhanced the prospects for stable and lasting peace” (Paris 
2004: 55). 
5
 Under the UN transitional administration, there were efforts to create a modern legal system that operated 
under rule of law principles, but it was an international rather than state system.  
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6
 The terms “Timor-Leste” and “East Timor” are both used in this article. East Timor is used for the period prior to 
statehood and Timor-Leste for the period after independence in 2002.  
7
 ASF designated these actors “Community Legal Liaisons,” but the term is synonymous with paralegals even in the 
ASF’s own materials.  
8
 State policy shifted to allow direct engagement with customary law with the new post-crisis government in 2007, 
but ASF still avoided engagement with customary law. 
9
 Yet there is a tradeoff here, discussed more below, in that paralegals do not perform the same functions as 
lawyers and programs tended to be most effective when linked to professional attorneys (Coghlan and Hayati 
2012). 
10
 Even in Sierra Leone, which is routinely lauded as a model system, paralegals serve state goals. State law 
“explicitly provid[es] that paralegals are to be deployed in each of Sierra Leone’s 149 chiefdoms” (Conteh and 
Teale 2012). 
